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MYANMAR’S DEMOCRACY STRUGGLE:
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE UPON
ROHINGYA WOMEN AND YOUTH
Engy Abdelkader †
Abstract: Since the end of its military rule in 2011, the international community
has rewarded Myanmar for perceived political and economic reforms. Still, Burma’s
transition to democratic governance is beset by an unfortunate human rights record and
marred by state-sanctioned violence against members of its minority Rohingya Muslim
population. This article explores the conflict’s impact upon Muslim women and children.
It argues that the group is experiencing human rights violations that are specific to its
identity and have yet to be adequately recognized and addressed. These violations
emanate from discriminatory population control regulations, gender based violence,
human trafficking, hard labor, and educational inequality. Such a perspective has not yet
been examined in legal scholarship and discourse. This article further argues that official
Burmese1 policies and normative practices targeting the country’s Muslim population
continue to compromise Burma’s local, regional, and global security interests. To help
protect those interests and prevent further human rights violations, this article proposes a
number of related legal and policy recommendations, including: a) amending the 1982
Citizenship Act; b) engaging in public education campaigns to help dispel many of the
myths that represent causal factors in anti-Muslim violence; c) providing resources and
support for victims of gender based violence; and d) exercising increased vigilance in
identifying, investigating, and prosecuting all those who facilitate human trafficking.

I.

INTRODUCTION
“I wouldn’t have to live this life if I wasn’t a Muslim.” Anwar
Sardad, a ten-year-old child laboring in Myanmar, October
2013.2

In recent years, the dominant narrative surrounding the opening of
Myanmar is one of dramatic transition from decades-long military rule to
†

Ms. Abdelkader is the U.S. Representative to the Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of
Religion or Belief at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. She is the recipient of an
invitation-only Speaker and Specialist grant from the U.S. Department of State in gender, human rights,
and Islam. She also currently chairs the American Bar Association’s Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Committee on National Security and Civil Liberties. The opinions expressed in this article
represent the author’s personal views and not those of said organizations. The author expresses sincere
gratitude to her family for their continued support.
1
The country is also commonly referenced as Myanmar. This article uses both designations
interchangeably.
2
Robin McDowell, Rohingya Kids in Myanmar: Hard Labor, Bleak Lives, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
15, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/suffering-dogs-rohingya-kids-myanmar (“The 10-year-old struggles
up the hill, carrying buckets filled with rocks. Though he tries to keep a brave face in front of his friends,
his eyes brim with tears. Every inch of his body aches, he says, and he feels sick and dizzy from the weight.
‘I hate it,’ whispers Anwar Sardad. He has to help support his family, but he wishes there was a way other
than working for the government construction agency.”).
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democratic governance.3 Since the 2011 elections ushered in Thein Sein as
Myanmar’s President,4 the international community has rewarded perceived
political and economic reforms with eased international sanctions,5 foreign
business investments,6 and enhanced public diplomacy initiatives.7
3

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Secretary’s Preface, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2012 (2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper (“We cover
the horrifying violence in Syria, historic elections in Egypt, Georgia, and Libya, and the promising
democratic opening in Burma.”); David Pilling, Myanmar Keeps its Transition on the Road–But only Just,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f2cea14-2ac6-11e3-ade3-00144feab7de.
html#axzz2tDJz8bBj (“The world has just about got used to the fact of Myanmar’s remarkable transition
since the leaders of the pariah nation formerly known as Burma shed their military fatigues.”); Myanmar
Must Continue Making Gains in Democratic Transition–UN Chief, UN NEWS CTR. (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://www.un.org/apps/news//story.asp?NewsID=46059&Cr=myanmar&Cr1#.UvzYKxadDzI
(“Commending Myanmar for its remarkable progress, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today stressed that
the South-east Asian country must continue its democratic transition and overcome the inter-communal
violence that is threatening it. ‘Myanmar continues a journey towards a more open and broad-based
democracy. Its robust civil society will play an increasingly crucial role as a bridge between government
and citizens, in the process strengthening accountability, transparency and participation,’ Mr. Ban told a
ministerial meeting of his Group of Friends on Myanmar, which met on the margins of the 68th General
Assembly in New York. Mr. Ban praised President Thein Sein’s commitment to bring the country towards
peace, democracy and an open market, as well as the recent release of various political prisoners. However,
he warned that the security situation remains fragile, and called for measures to ease tensions in the
country.”); German President Praises Myanmar for Transition to Democracy, EUR. ONLINE MAG. (Feb. 9,
2014), http://en.europeonline-magazine.eu/german-president-praises-myanmar-for-transition-todemocracy_317425.html (“German President Joachim Gauck on Sunday praised Myanmar for making
steps towards democracy, adding that the country‘s progress was the reason that Germany had approved a
[EUR 500 million] debt relief package for the southeast Asian country. ‘Burma has made bold steps
towards democracy,’ said Gauck during a visit to the Shwedadong Pagoda in Myanmar‘s capital Yangon,
which marked the first state visit by a German president to Burma since 1986.”).
4
Thomas Fuller, Parliament Picks Insider as President of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/asia/05myanmar.html.
5
See, e.g., Ernest Z. Bower & Murray Hiebert, U.S. Eases Myanmar Sanctions in Response to
Reforms, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES (May 18, 2012), http://csis.org/publication/us-easesmyanmar-sanctions-response-reforms; EU Agrees to Suspend Most Burma Sanctions, BBC (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17813656.
6
See, e.g., Aung Hla Tun & Jared Ferrie, Foreign investment in Myanmar surges, office rents sizzle,
REUTERS
(Sept.
20,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/myanmar-investment-id
USL3N0HG0L420130920.
7
See, e.g., Peter Baker, Obama, in an Emerging Myanmar, Vows Support, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2012), at A3, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/world/asia/obama-heads-to-myanmar-as-it-promisesmore-reforms.html (“Mr. Obama arrived here as the first sitting American president to visit Myanmar with
the hope of solidifying the stunning changes that have transformed this Southeast Asian country and
encouraging additional progress toward a more democratic system. With the promise of more financial
assistance, Mr. Obama vowed to ‘support you every step of the way.’”); President Obama Meets with
President Thein Sein of Myanmar, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 20, 2013, 6:30 PM)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/05/20/president-obama-meets-president-thein-sein-myanmar
(“Today President Obama welcomed President Thein Sein of Myanmar to the White House for a bilateral
meeting, the first visit to the United States by a leader of that country in almost 50 years.”); EU Foreign
Policy Chief Visits Myanmar, CNN (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/28/world/asia/myanmarashton-visit/ (“EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton met with Myanmar's pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Kyi Saturday, as she became the latest in a series of high-ranking international figures to visit the
country. Ashton is also expected to meet President Thein Sein during her three-day visit to Myanmar, also
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Most recently, in October 2013, Myanmar was awarded the rotating
chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) for 2014 in
what was widely regarded as a diplomatic prize for its broad strides toward
democratic reform.8 President Thein Sein declared the theme of Burma’s
incoming chairmanship as “moving forward in unity in a peaceful and
prosperous community.”9
Still, Myanmar’s struggle with democracy is beset with an unfortunate
human rights record, which is marred by government-sanctioned antiMuslim violence.10 This article builds upon prior research examining the
experience of the Rohingya Muslim11 community in Burma through both a
historical and contemporary lens. 12 That research explored both the
humanitarian and human rights challenges confronting Muslims, who
constitute approximately five percent of Myanmar’s estimated sixty-million
people,13 and suffer from discriminatory laws and policies that infringe upon
the free exercise of religion,14 freedom of movement,15 access to education,16
known as Burma. The trip, which follows a series of political reforms in Myanmar, marks the latest step in
the country's international rehabilitation after decades of isolation.”).
8
Myanmar Takes ASEAN Chair, ABS-CBN NEWS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.abscbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/10/10/13/myanmar-takes-asean-chair.
9
Id. (“In April, Human Rights Watch accused Myanmar of ‘a campaign of ethnic cleansing’ against
members of the Rohingya Muslim minority—an accusation rejected by Thein Sein as a ‘smear
campaign.’”).
10
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Burma 2012 Human Rights Report, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204400.pdf.
11
The Rohingya are members of a distinct cultural group in Burma who are also Muslim; the
group’s faith and ethnic identities are commonly conflated. However, not all Burmese Muslims are
necessarily Rohingya although they may also be subject to persecution.
12
See generally Engy Abdelkader, The Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar: Past, Present and Future,
OR. REV. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014); see also An Unclear Roadmap: Burma’s Fragile Political Reforms
and Growing Ethnic Strife: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. of
Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. 23-24 (2013) (statement of Wakar Uddin, Dir. Gen. of the Arakan Rohingya
Union), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20130919/101329/HHRG-113-FA05Transcript-20130919.pdf (“The plight of the Rohingya people dates back to 1962; however, they
experienced the worst violence and bloodbath in Rakhine/Arakan state in 2012 and 2013. The violence and
massacre of Burmese Muslims in central Burma in 2013 follow the anti-Muslim attacks in central Burma in
2001, 2003, and 2006, but this year's attacks were far more dramatic . . . . In Rohingya areas in
Rakhine/Arakan State, the Burmese government could have prevented the violence against Rohingya
through its security apparatus with massive military force as it did during the handling of the uprising of
monks in central Burma. The Burmese government did not have the willpower to protect the Rohingya
from violence by Rakhine mobs backed by Burmese/Rakhine police forces.”).
13
See Kyaw Phyo Tha, Burma Imprisons Two Muslim Women for Sparking Okkan Unrest, THE
IRRAWADDY (June 18, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/conflict/burma-imprisons-two-muslim-womenfor-sparking-okkan-unrest.html.
14
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Burma 2012 International Religious Freedom Report, in
INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
REPORT
FOR
2012
(2013),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208430.pdf. “Societal abuses and discrimination based on a
mix of ethnicity and religious affiliation, belief, or practice occurred. Longstanding social tensions
between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Rakhine State erupted in communal violence in June
and October that claimed an estimated 250 lives and resulted in more than 100,000 displaced persons and
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and equal employment opportunities.17 Notably, the group remains stateless
to date because the country’s 1982 Citizenship Act deprives the Rohingya of
citizenship rights, further exasperating their struggle for survival.18 Such
laws codify the general societal bias that constitutes the Rohingya’s
normative experience in Burma, including prejudice from both wellrespected human rights advocates and ethnic minorities who themselves
have struggled against official acts of oppression and repression.19 Indeed,
the United Nations (“UN”) has aptly depicted the Rohingya as “virtually
friendless.”20
the segregation of the two groups. Villages of Kaman people, an officially recognized Muslim ‘national
race’ group distinct from the Rohingya, were burned to the ground during the second wave of violence in
October. An estimated 3,000 Kaman Muslims were attacked, indicating that some of the violence was
aimed not only against the Rohingya, but against Muslims in general.” Id.
15
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (“The government restricted the ability of IDPs, refugees,
and stateless persons to move.”).
16
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 14 (“Without citizenship status Rohingya did not have
access to secondary education in state-run schools. Authorities did not permit those Muslim students from
Rakhine State who completed high school to travel outside the state to attend college or university.”).
17
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (“Rohingya experienced severe legal, economic, and
social discrimination.”); Khin Maung Lay, Burma Fuels the Rohingya Tragedy, KALADAN PRESS
NETWORK (Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.kaladanpress.org/index.php/article-mainmenu-27/16-rohingyaarticle/1894-burma-fuels-the-rohingya-tragedy.html) (“In his 2007 report ‘Caught Between Two Tigers,’
Graham Thom, Amnesty International Australia's refugee coordinator, writes: ‘In an effort to encourage
their departure to Bangladesh, their freedom of religion and movement is restricted; they must apply for
permission to marry, their land has been confiscated and they suffer severe economic constraints. The
military has murdered fathers and husbands and raped mothers, sisters and daughters. They are routinely
subjected to brutal forced labor, arbitrary taxation and constant humiliations.’ Additionally, the
establishment of a growing number of Buddhist-settler villages has changed the demographic composition
in Arakan.”).
18
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (“The 1982 citizenship law classifies citizens based on
ethnicity and effectively makes more than one million residents stateless, including the Rohingya and those
of Chinese, Indian, Nepali, and Eurasian descent. The UNHCR continued to advocate for amendment of
the 1982 citizenship law to focus on civic rather than ethnic nationality, but the government did not provide
stateless persons the opportunity to gain nationality on a nondiscriminatory basis during the year. The 1982
citizenship law grants full citizenship to anyone whose parents are both one of the 135 officially recognized
‘national races.’ The law deems as a national race only ethnic groups that can trace origins back to 1823,
the year before the British began to colonize Burma, or earlier. Two lesser forms of citizenship exist,
associate or naturalized citizenship; these citizens are unable to run for political office, inherit land or
money, or access the full range of educational opportunities. The government asserted that most Rohingya
were recent economic migrants and denied full citizenship on the grounds their ancestors did not belong to
a national race. Only Rohingya who were able to prove three generations of residence in country were
eligible to apply for naturalization. NGOs reported that Rohingya in northern Rakhine State who applied
for naturalization with all required documents did not receive replies. Lawyers and activists noted that
some Rohingya could also secure naturalization or ‘associate’ citizenship through bribery or by
registering.”).
19
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Burma: Government Forces Targeting Rohingya Muslims,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-watch/burma-governmentforces-t_b_1738063.html.
20
See Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, THOMSON REUTERS
FOUNDATION (July 17, 2013), http://www.trust.org/item/20130711095259-lup2a/.
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Anti-Muslim violence continues unabated while spreading to
previously unaffected regions in Myanmar.21 The human rights situation is
further compounded by increasingly volatile nationalist-Buddhist
extremism 22 coupled with official complacency and complicity 23 in the
deaths of men, women, and children; destruction of homes, businesses, and
mosques; and forced migration. 24 Indeed, violent clashes between the
minority Muslim population and majority Buddhists in October and June
2012 left several hundred dead and more than 140,000 people—primarily
Muslim—internally displaced and left to live in squalid conditions within
refugee and other camps.25 Thousands of Rohingya, including increasing

21

See Abdelkader, supra note 12; see also Kyaw Phyo Tha, supra note 13 (“Before the rioting in
Okkan, inter-communal strife between Buddhists and Muslims broke out last year in west Burma's Arakan
State. The violence spread this year to central Burma and east Burma—with clashes in the town of
Meikhtila, then in Okkan, and mostly recently in Lashio. In total, more than 200 people have been killed
and more than 150,000 people—mostly Muslims—have been displaced.”).
22
See Richard Lloyd Parry, Bomb Attack on 'Burmese bin Laden' Leaves Five Hurt, THE TIMES (July
23, 2013), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article3822758.ece.
23
See John Sparks, Dangerous Waters for Burma’s Rohingya Minority, CHANNEL 4 NEWS (June 25,
2012), http://www.channel4.com/news/dangerous-waters-for-rohingyas-forgotten-people (“Her husband
Mohammad said that local policemen and members of the military in Burma had sided with the ethnic
Buddhists—participating in attacks on Muslims. He said he saw a Burmese helicopter attack boats packed
with refugees: ‘There were three boats together when we set off—and another three followed us. The three
boats that lagged behind where attacked by a helicopter and caught fire.’ He thinks almost 50 people were
killed, adding: ‘We saw something reddish fall on the boats and instantly they exploded into flames.’ A
regional official in Burma today denied this allegation, pointing out that there was ‘only one’ helicopter in
Rakhine state which is ‘unarmed.’ Still, events in Burma are a catastrophe for the Rohingya, a little-known
group of people who nobody seems to want. Only dialogue and generosity and human decency will
prevent further loss of life.”).
24
See Aung San Suu Kyi Urged to Place Human Rights, Anti-Muslim Violence at the top of the
Agenda, ASIAN TRIB., (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.asiantribune.com/node/65447; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 19 (“Burmese security forces committed killings, rape, and mass arrests against
Rohingya Muslims after failing to protect both them and Arakan Buddhists during deadly sectarian
violence in western Burma in June 2012. Government restrictions on humanitarian access to the Rohingya
community have left many of the over 100,000 people displaced and in dire need of food, shelter, and
medical care.”); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (“International NGOs estimated that the
outbreak of communal violence in Rakhine State displaced more than 115,000 persons, including Rohingya,
Kaman Muslims, and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists. There was little access to clean water, sanitation, and
health and education services in the IDP areas, and many displaced persons were unable to grow sufficient
food due to continual threats necessitating flight.”).
25
See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Buddhist Mobs Torch Muslim Homes in Myanmar as Sectarian
Violence Continues, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/buddhistmobs-torch-muslim-homes-myanmar-sectarian-violence-continues-article-1.1472705.
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numbers of women and children, have sought refuge in Thailand, 26
Bangladesh,27 and Malaysia.28
This article explores the plight of Muslim women and children, in
particular. It argues that women and children are increasingly finding
themselves in vulnerable situations that have yet to be adequately recognized
and addressed in the Burmese context. Such a perspective has not yet been
examined in legal scholarship and discourse. This article is organized in
three parts. Part II examines the ways that women and youth are uniquely
impacted by the escalating violence against the Rohingya and other Muslim
populations in Myanmar. This section examines several types of vulnerable
circumstances created by discriminatory population control regulations,
gender-based violence, human trafficking, hard labor, and education
inequality. Part III contemplates the security implications of continued
Burmese persecution of its Rohingya Muslim population while Part IV
engages in a related discussion and analysis of their plight. It articulates a
number of legal and policy recommendations, including a) amending the
1982 Citizenship Act; b) engaging in public education campaigns to help
dispel many of the myths that represent causal factors in anti-Muslim
violence; c) providing resources and support for victims of gender based
violence; and d) exercising increased vigilance in identifying, investigating
and prosecuting all those that facilitate human trafficking. The article closes
with several concluding remarks.
II.

MUSLIM WOMEN AND YOUTH IN VULNERABLE CIRCUMSTANCES

This Part examines the ways that Muslim women and youth are
uniquely impacted by communal violence in Myanmar, including, but not
limited to, discriminatory birth control regulations, gender-based violence,
vulnerability to human trafficking, hard labor, and education inequality.
These human rights violations are compounded, if not facilitated by, the
26

See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (“Emigration and Repatriation: According to the
UNHCR, 83,401 registered Burmese refugees lived in nine camps in Thailand as of November. The
estimated total number of refugees, including unregistered new arrivals, was approximately 140,000. The
government allowed the UNHCR and other organizations limited access to monitor potential areas of return
to assess conditions for the eventual voluntary return of refugees and IDPs.”).
27
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19 (“Since the June violence, thousands of Rohingya
have fled to neighboring Bangladesh where they have faced pushbacks from the Bangladeshi government
in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch witnessed Rohingya men, women, and children
who arrived onshore and pleaded for mercy from Bangladesh authorities, only to be pushed back to sea in
barely seaworthy wooden boats during rough monsoon rains, putting them at grave risk of drowning or
starvation at sea or persecution in Burma. It is unknown how many died in these pushbacks. Those who
were able to make it into Bangladesh live in hiding, with no access to food, shelter, or protection.”).
28
See Myanmar Takes ASEAN Chair, supra note 8.
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country’s citizenship law rendering Rohingya men, women, and children
“stateless.” 29 As a result of their “stateless” status, the group suffers
restrictions on movement, forced labor, confiscation of property, forced
eviction from, and demolition of, houses, discriminatory taxation, and
limitations on marriage, employment, health care, and education. 30
Unfortunately, such discriminatory laws and policies provide fertile ground
for acts of anti-Muslim violence.
Since chivalric ideals often inform perceptions that women and
children should not be targeted in conflict zones,31 it is significant to note
first that amid worsening communal strife, Burmese Muslim women and
girls have in fact suffered in ways similar to their male counterparts. For
instance, in June 2013, Burmese security officials killed several female
Rohingya villagers who peacefully protested the government’s efforts to
relocate their families to a new camp, taking them away from the housing
they had collectively resided in since Buddhist extremists burned their
homes during violent clashes that erupted the previous year.32 One victim’s
pregnancy did not seem to warrant special protection from the shooting
officers; perhaps this is due to a perception of pregnant women as carrying
future generations of unwanted Rohingya or Muslims.33
29

See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10 (Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Act recognizes 135
“national races” to whom it grants full citizenship rights. The law deems as a national race only ethnic
groups that can trace origins back to 1823, the year before the British began to colonize Burma, or earlier.
Two lesser forms of citizenship exist: associate or naturalized citizenship. These citizens are unable to run
for political office, inherit land or money, or access the full range of educational opportunities. The
government asserted that most Rohingya were recent economic migrants and denied full citizenship on the
grounds their ancestors did not belong to a national race. Only Rohingya who were able to prove three
generations of residence in country were eligible to apply for naturalization. NGOs reported that Rohingya
in northern Rakhine State who applied for naturalization with all required documents did not receive replies.
Lawyers and activists noted that some Rohingya could also secure naturalization or “associate” citizenship
through bribery or by registering); see also Burma Citizenship Law, 1982 (Myan.) available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html (The system's anchor is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which
in both design and implementation effectively denies the right to a nationality to the Rohingya population.
It supersedes all previous citizenship regimes in Myanmar. The 1982 Citizenship Law creates three classes
of citizens—full, associate, and naturalized—none of which has been conferred on most Rohingyas.)
30
See Benjamin Zawacki, Defining Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya Problem,’ 20 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18 (201213); see generally Abdelkader, supra note 12.
31
See Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women and Armed Conflict: The International Response to
the Beijing Platform for Action, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2000).
32
See ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN, Myanmar Must do More to Curb Abuses Against Rohingya
Muslims: UN Expert, PAK. OBSERVER (June 13, 2013), http://pakobserver.net/201306/13/
detailnews.asp?id=209656; see also Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,
Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Human Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/58 (Mar. 6,
2013).
33
See Min Thein Aung, Three Rohingya Women Shot Dead, Several Injured Over Housing Dispute,
RADIO FREE ASIA (June 5, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingya-0605201317
2809.html/.
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During the same month elsewhere in Burma, a court sentenced two
Muslim women to two years in prison and hard labor for allegedly causing
communal strife in the town of Okkan.34 The violence transpired several
months earlier after one of the women bumped into a Buddhist monk,
causing his food to spill and his alms bowl to break.35 According to another
account, one of the women also shook the monk by his shoulders (it is
religiously inappropriate in Buddhism for women to have such physical
contact with monks).36 The women had been convicted of “insulting [the
Buddhist] religion” in contravention of a criminal law prohibiting
“deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.”37 Observers have noted
that while the prototypical victims of Burma’s communal violence have
been Muslim, the majority of those convicted of related criminal offenses
have also been Muslim, potentially speaking to biases within the country’s
legal, judicial, and security structures.38
In addition, for approximately three consecutive days in March 2013,
anti-Muslim violence erupted in the Burmese town of Meiktila where groups
of men disguised in monks’ robes fatally assaulted Muslim women and
children by “hacking them to death.” 39 The men were believed to be
associated with the so-called “969” campaign that promotes anti-Muslim
boycotts and opposes Buddhist-Muslim intermarriages.40 Burmese officials
have declared the region to be under a “State of Emergency” on-and-off
since that time.41
To be sure, the human rights violations committed against the
Rohingya and other Muslims are widespread, systematic, and without
accountability, as the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation
in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, has recently observed.42 But while the
human rights violations depicted above are gender neutral, Muslim women
34

See Kyaw Phyo Tha, supra note 13.
See id. (“Notwithstanding a formal apology the incident reportedly angered local Buddhists,
leading to anti-Muslim rioting in the city about 100 kilometers from Rangoon. One Muslim man was killed
and nine were injured in the unrest, while 81 homes and a mosque were burned to the ground.”); see also
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Myanmar: Muslim Women Sentenced to Hard Labor, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013), at
A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/asia/muslim-women-sentenced-to-hard-labor-in-myanmar.
html.
36
See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 35.
37
See Kyaw Phyo Tha, supra note 13.
38
See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 35.
39
See Parry, supra note 22.
40
See infra Part III.
41
Burmese Village Violence Against Children & Families Must Stop, Says UNICEF, WNN (Oct. 9,
2013), http://womennewsnetwork.net/2013/10/09/burmese-violence-unicef/.
42
See ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN, supra note 32; see also Special Rapporteur on the Situation
of Human Rights in Myanmar, supra note 32.
35
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and youth are experiencing violence in a manner that is specific to their
identities, including, but not limited to, discriminatory birth control
regulations, gender-based violence, human trafficking, hard labor, and
education inequality.
A.

Discriminatory Population Control Regulations

For decades, Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims have been subject to
local regulations—also referred to as the “two-child rule”—designed to
control the group’s population growth. 43 Applicable exclusively to the
minority group, authorities enforce the policy together with regulations
requiring Muslim couples to secure official approval, by remitting sizable
bribes, prior to marrying. 44 Couples are often forced to wait lengthy
periods—as long as two years in some instances—for advance permission.45
The marriage application process also includes mandatory pregnancy tests.46
Additionally, each couple must provide a signed statement that they will not
have more than two children, with the understanding that violating the twochild rule could result in fines and imprisonment.47 The policy uniquely
impacts Muslim women and children: the former risk physical danger while
the latter risk placement on an official blacklist.48 President Thein Sein’s
administration continues to support the policy under the pretext of curbing
rapid Muslim population growth allegedly designed to surreptitiously
overcome the country’s Buddhist majority.49

43

See Harrison Akins, No Place for Islam? Buddhist Nationalism in Myanmar, AL JAZEERA (Oct.
2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/no-place-islam-buddhist-nationalism-myanmar2013101710411233906.html.
44
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BURMA: REVOKE ‘TWO-CHILD POLICY FOR ROHINGYA (2013) available
at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/28/burma-revoke-two-child-policy-rohingya (“Advance permission
to marry came from the Na Sa Ka (in Burmese, Nay Sut Kut Kwey Ye), a corrupt interagency border guard
force comprising military, police, immigration, and customs.”).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44 (“Rakhine State Spokesperson Win Myaing claimed
local officials sought to implement a recommendation by the government Inquiry Commission on the
Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, a 27-member body appointed to examine the causes of last year’s
deadly violence between ethnic Arakanese (Rakhine) Buddhists and Rohingya and Kaman Muslims. The
commission’s summary report, released on April 29, 2013, called for ‘implementation of family planning
programs amongst Bengali [Rohingya] communities’ to address its ‘rapid population growth.’ However,
the report said that ‘government and other civil society organizations should refrain from implementing
mandatory measures which could seem unfair and abusive.’ The commission included political leaders of
Arakanese Buddhists but did not include any Rohingya members.”).
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A Rohingya woman who bears more than two children is confronted
with the difficult decision to either: a) seek refuge in another country;50 b)
seek an abortion;51 or c) remain in the country and give birth to a blacklisted
child. 52 In the event she attempts to terminate the preganancy, her
circumstances are exacerbated by Article 312 of Burma’s penal code, which
criminalizes abortion except where the woman’s life is endangered.53 As a
result, a Muslim woman who wishes to abort an unborn fetus must undergo
such a procedure in an unsanitary unlicensed facility or self-induce an
abortion at home.54 The circumstances are so precarious that many women
die in the process,55 thus contributing to Burma’s high rates of maternal
death.56 It is significant to note that aborting an unborn fetus is generally
prohibited in Islam after the initial 120 days of the pregnancy except under
very specific conditions. 57 As such, this option not only jeopardizes a
woman’s physical health and well-being, but may also force her to betray a
sincerely held religious belief and subject her to severe stigmatic harm in the
event that co-religionists learn of her decision.
In addition to endangering women’s physical, emotional, and mental
health in violation of international law, the two-child rule adversely impacts
children as well. In the event a woman opts to remain in the country after
violating the rule, the child is deprived of any legal status.58 As a result, the
child cannot access education, receive official permission to travel, marry, or
acquire any property.59 Burmese officials may also arrest and detain the
child.60
To avoid such repercussions, a woman may bribe a legally married
couple to register her child as their own or avoid registering the birth with
officials to escape penalties—such as fines or imprisonment—associated
with violating the law.61 Many couples avoid registering their marriages
50

See infra Part II.C. (women who flee the country are vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking. As
such, communities are impacted as daughters, mothers, aunts, nieces, friends, and neighbors are forced to
abandon everything they know to secure refuge elsewhere.).
51
See Akins, supra note 43.
52
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44.
53
See Myanmar: The Penal Code, Article 312, available at http://www.burmalibrary.org
/docs6/MYANMAR_PENAL_CODE-corr.1.pdf; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 43.
54
See Akins, supra note 43; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44.
55
See Akins, supra note 43.
56
See id.
57
There are different jurisprudential positions about when and if an abortion is permitted. See, e.g.,
Khaled A. Fadl, Fatwa, SCHOLAR OF THE HOUSE, http://www.scholarofthehouse.org/fabydrabelfa1.html
(last visited May 8, 2014).
58
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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altogether in order to evade the population-control measure even though it
necessarily means that children born under such circumstances will remain
unregistered and lack any legal status.62 According to one government
report, there are approximately 60,000 unregistered Rohingya children in
Myanmar today.63 To be sure, a woman’s choice vis-à-vis the two-child rule
—seeking refuge in other countries, aborting the unborn fetus, or birthing a
child subject to an official blacklist—impacts not only her life, but her
family and community as well.
It is important to note that while the two-child law was initially
conceived, implemented, and enforced during Myanmar’s military rule,
President Thein Sein’s administration has left the policy wholly undisturbed
and local government officials have lent support for the rule.64 In April
2013, for instance, a report issued by a state government commission tasked
with investigating the incidents of communal violence between ethnic
Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine State depicted such family planning
programs as an effective mechanism for countering the Muslim
community’s “rapid population growth,” which was characterized as a
causal factor motivating the violence experienced by the Rohingya in
Rakhine. 65
In fact, the discriminatory measure is informed by false assumptions
surrounding Muslim birth rates.66 Burmese officials frequently engage such
political rhetoric attributing anti-Muslim violence to the minority
community’s “rapid population growth.” 67 Representative are public
62

Id.
Id.
64
See Akins, supra note 43; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44 (“The Arakan State
spokesperson, Win Myaing, told the media on May 26 that local authorities had reaffirmed a 2005
regulation for Rohingya Muslims in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships in northwestern Arakan State
along the Bangladesh border.”).
65
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44 (“Rakhine State Spokesperson Win Myaing claimed
local officials sought to implement a recommendation by the government Inquiry Commission on the
Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, a 27-member body appointed to examine the causes of last year’s
deadly violence between ethnic Arakanese (Rakhine) Buddhists and Rohingya and Kaman Muslims. The
commission’s summary report, released on April 29, 2013, called for ‘implementation of family planning
programs amongst Bengali [Rohingya] communities’ to address its ‘rapid population growth.’ However,
the report said that ‘government and other civil society organizations should refrain from implementing
mandatory measures which could seem unfair and abusive.’ The commission included political leaders of
Arakanese Buddhists but did not include any Rohingya members.”).
66
See DAVID DAPICE & NGUYEN XUAN THANH, CREATING A FUTURE: USING NATURAL RESOURCES
FOR NEW FEDERALISM AND UNITY, 26 ASH CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION
(2013), available at http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/creating.pdf.
67
Do 'Rapidly Breeding' Rohingya Muslims Really Threaten Myanmar's Buddhist Identity?, THE
GLOBAL POST (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/myanmar/
131011/rohingya-demographics-population-boom-myth (“Certain cities enforce a two-child limit on their
women and government reports insist their ‘rapid population growth’ has provoked Buddhists into torching
their homes and taking their lives.”).
63
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statements alleging that a) Muslims are striving to “Islamize” Burmese
society through exploding birth rates; b) Rohingya are reproducing ten times
faster than Buddhists; and c) Muslims are analogous to “African carp” that
breed quickly and behave violently.68 Such sentiments evidence general
societal prejudice and an unsubstantiated popular fear that Muslim
population growth may eventually render the now-Buddhist-majority a
minority in Myanmar. 69 Such misinformation concerning the minority
religious community should not be taken lightly—it has prompted public
calls in Myanmar for the Rohingya’s mass expulsion. 70
Interestingly, Harvard researchers have recently debunked this “rapid
population growth” myth.71 After examining official government data, the
academics found the Rohingya to have one of the country’s lowest
population growth rates.72 As such, the researchers found the evidence
inconsistent with widely circulated allegations concerning a threatening
population shift.73 They encourage undertaking additional research, such as
a Burmese government census, to help government officials make more
informed and effective policy decisions.74
Moreover, researchers note that even if Muslim population growth
was threatening to overtake Myanmar’s Buddhists, the most effective
government response includes equal access to education, health care, and
68

Id. (“A politician named Shwe Maung told The Economist that ‘they are trying to Islamize us
through their terrible birth rate.’ Rakhine State government spokesman Win Myaing has claimed to India’s
The Hindu that the Rohingya population growth is ten times that of native Buddhists. Extremist monk
Wirathu, the best-known face of Myanmar’s swelling anti-Muslim movement, told GlobalPost that
‘Muslims are like the African carp. They breed quickly and they are very violent. They eat their own
kind.’”).
69
See Dapice & Nguyen Xuan Thanh, supra note 66.
70
See id. (“The violence in Rakhine state has led to many remarks about the uncontrolled migration
of Bangladeshi migrants into Rakhine. As many of those who were actually born in Rakhine often cannot
prove it, some argue that any person who is Muslim and appears to be South Asian must be a migrant and
should be expelled. In addition to migration, the rate of births of the Muslim families are said to be higher
than the Buddhist and there is fear expressed that the proportion of Islamic people will increase and make
the Buddhists a minority in their own country.”).
71
Id.
72
Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44 (“He is also dubious of accusations of out-ofcontrol birthrates among Rohingya women. Rakhine State—home to roughly 800,000 Rohingya Muslims,
according to the United Nations—has one of Myanmar’s lowest population growth rates. The region’s
overall population is estimated at 3.3 million.”).
73
Dapice & Nguyen Xuan Thanh, supra note 66 (“The official data show a slightly lower
population growth rate in Rakhine compared to all of Myanmar for the 1955-2010 period. If the population
of Rakhine had grown at the national rate from 1955, the 2010 population would be 3.46 million instead of
3.3 million. Unless there is a severe underestimation of the Rakhine population, it does not appear that the
population changes are large enough to shift relative population shares much. This also shows up in the
national Muslim population share which was no higher in 1983 than in 1953—more recent and reliable data
are not available. Note that this data is completely inconsistent with widely circulated fears that the rapidly
growing Muslim share of population is threatening Myanmar’s Buddhists.”).
74
Id.
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economic opportunity for the country’s ethnic and religious minorities.75
Harvard’s findings comport with related recommendations by the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, tasked with monitoring compliance
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) to which Burma
acceded, calling upon the country to revoke the discriminatory birth control
regulation.76 Notably, in May 2013, President Thein Sein indicated that his
administration would review the subject regulation.77 However, at the time
of writing this article, the policy remains intact.
B.

Gender-Based Violence

As previously mentioned, Rohingya women have also experienced
anti-Muslim violence in ways that are unique to their gender. Amid
escalating conflict, rights groups have noted increasing reports of rape from
Muslim women and girls in recent years. 78 The following accounts
illustrate the current situation: gender-based violence involving the
Rohingya has intensified, disrupting families and communities. Moreover,
attempts to seek refuge abroad compound the risk to women and girls of
rape, exploitation, and trafficking.
To be sure, sexual assaults against Rohingya women are by no means
a new phenomenon—Burmese security forces have engaged in such human
rights violations for a number of years.79 But as the violence has escalated,
75

Id. (“Under such conditions, birth rates tend to drop – the fertility rate in mainly Muslim nations
such as Bangladesh dropped from 4.5 in 1990 to 2.2 in 2010 and in Indonesia it dropped from 3.1 in 1990
to 2.1 in 2010. This is very close to Myanmar’s 2.0 in 2010 – a rate that may be depressed due to the
migration of millions of younger workers.”).
76
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44 (“In March 2012, the United Nations Committee on
the Rights of the Child, which monitors state compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
called upon Burma to ‘abolish the local order restricting marriages for Rohingya people and cease practices
which restrict the number of children of Rohingya people.’”); see also Joshua Lipes, Myanmar to
Reexamine Divisive Birth Rule, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 31, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/
myanmar/children-05312013171333.html (“The United Nations deputy spokesman Eduardo del Buey on
Thursday said the decision to restore the two-child limit on Rohingyas would be discriminatory and called
on authorities in Rakhine state ‘to remove such policies or practices.’”).
77
See Lipes, supra note 76 (“‘We are reexamining this order,’ President Thein Sein’s spokesman Ye
Htut told RFA’s Myanmar Service, adding that the policy which bans Rohingya families from having more
than two children was regionally implemented and had not been developed in tandem with the central
government. Ye Htut’s statement marked the first time Thein Sein’s office has publicly commented on the
policy which, according to Rakhine state spokesperson Win Myaing, was initially introduced in 2005 and
reaffirmed earlier this month for Rohingyas in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships along the Bangladesh
border.”).
78
See Samantha Michaels, Burma Support Withheld on UN Pledge to End Sexual Violence,
IRRAWADDY (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/women-gender/burma-support-withheld-un-pledgeend-sexual-violence.html.
79
See Francis Wade, Rapes by Burmese Security Forces ‘May Cause More Strife’ in Troubled
Region, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/26/burma-securityforces-rape-arakan (“‘Sexual violence by Nasaka against Rohingya women has been documented for many
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so too have gendered assaults. Since June 2012, for example, the communal
strife in Arakan State included numerous instances of Buddhist extremists
gang raping Muslim women. 80 More recently, in February 2013, Burmese
security forces repeatedly raped thirteen Rohingya women and girls in a
small Arakanese village, with at least one nineteen-year-old woman left in
critical condition.81
Similar assaults against Rohingya and other Muslim women have also
occurred in Rakhine State, as recently documented by the UN Special
Rapporteur Ojea Quintana in his report to the Human Rights Council in
March 2013. 82 Most recently, in February 2014, a sixteen-year-old
Rohingya girl alleged that Burmese authorities raped her following the
murder of more than fifty local Muslims.83 Human rights advocates have
expressed concern that gender-based violence, attributed to entrenched
gender bias as well as ethno-religious prejudices, will further exasperate
already escalating communal violence in the region.84
Moreover, it is important to recognize that such attacks disrupt
families and communities, as they frequently result in instances of internal
displacement. 85 Survivors of sexual assault, particularly by Burmese
soldiers, are re-victimized by communities fearful of official retribution
should the victims decide to report their assaults.86 In the past, village elders
years,’ says Matthew Smith, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, adding that prosecutions are rare for
rapes committed by security forces.”).
80
See CBRO Urges Canadian Government to Press Burma on Rohingya Ethnic Cleansing,
KALADAN PRESS NETWORK (July 29, 2013), http://www.kaladanpress.org/news/332-news-2013/july2013/4298-cbro-urges-canadian-government-to-press-burma-on-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing
(“Numerous
women were gang-raped and tortured inhumanly in Arakan State since 2012 June. RNDP chairman Dr.
Aye Maung and 969 campaigner Monk Wira Thu went on barbaric rampage and anti-Muslims [sic]
violence. They gang-raped woman publicly, slaughtered any one [sic] in their way. This sorts [sic] of
barbaric misdeeds; these Buddhist extremists have committed them all, they have even poisoned the ponds
so that Muslims cannot even drink the water, according to CBRO member.”).
81
See Wade, supra note 79 (“One victim, an 18-year-old girl who cannot be named for security
reasons, described how a group of uniformed soldiers from Burma's border security unit, known locally as
NaSaKa, entered her house in northern Maungdaw township shortly after midnight on 20 February. ‘They
took us separately to different places and tortured and raped us,’ she said, referring also to her mother and
younger sister, 15. The ordeal lasted until dawn, she said. ‘They came in and out of the house at least 15
times. They also beat my mother with a gun and dragged her outside to the road and beat her to the ground.’
According to the victim, 13 people in the village were assaulted. Chris Lewa, head of the Arakan Project,
which has monitoring teams in Maungdaw township, said she had separately confirmed that at least 11
people were raped that night.”).
82
See Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, supra note 32; see also
ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN, supra note 32.
83
Rohingya Muslim Girl Allegedly Raped by Myanmar Police, WORLDBULLETIN NEWS (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.worldbulletin.net/muslim-world/128322/rohingya-muslim-girl-allegedly-raped-bymyanmar-police.
84
See Wade, supra note 79.
85
See, e.g. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44.
86
See Wade, supra note 79 (“Khin Ohmar, founder of the Women's League of Burma, said that such
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have subjected victims to expulsion.87 In other instances, villagers, who fear
further retribution in the event survivors choose to complain to Burmese
officials, have fled into nearby forests and across the border to neighboring
countries such as Bangladesh.88 Indeed, rape and sexual abuse have resulted
in the physical and psychological destruction of Rohingya women, families,
and communities.
Notably, Muslim women are also vulnerable to gender-based violence
while attempting to flee religious persecution in Myanmar. 89 Human
smugglers sexually exploit and rape women whom they have falsely
promised safe transport to a country of refuge, such as Malaysia, Thailand,
or Bangladesh.90 Such exploitation may occur at government-run detention
centers in other countries or during the course of flight.91 Reporting the
crimes can be particularly daunting, as authorities make clear that they are
uninterested in pursuing investigation.92 Further, reporting victims may face
ordeals terrorize the community. ‘I’ve heard of cases where rape survivors are kicked out of their village
because the village head is so scared of retribution if they complain to the Burma army.’”).
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
See Fleeing Rohingya Women Fall Prey to Traffickers in Thailand, IRRAWADDY (July 18, 2013),
http://www.irrawaddy.org/human-trafficking/fleeing-rohingya-women-fall-prey-to-traffickers-inthailand.html (“Narunisa is one of 62 women and children at the shelter in Phang Nga, near Thailand’s
popular beach resorts. The 25-year-old fled Arakan State in western Burma when it became impossible to
make a living after two bouts of sectarian violence last year left scores dead and some 140,000 displaced,
most of them Muslims. Narunisa’s village, unlike many others, was not destroyed in the violence, but her
source of income quickly vanished when she could no longer go to the main market in Arakan’s capital
Sittwe to sell fruits and vegetables she had grown. Sittwe is now, except in one cordoned-off area, devoid
of Muslims.”).
90
See Man Charged with Trafficking Rohingya Refugees may Face Rape Charges, PHUKET
GAZETTE (June 22, 2013), http://www.phuketgazette.net/phuket_news/2013/Man-charged-with-traffickingRohingya-refugees-may-face-rape-charges-21412.html (“One of five Rohingya who escaped the Phang
Nga Shelter for Children and Family is waiting for doctors to confirm her claims of being raped, for three
consecutive nights, by the human trafficker that had promised to get her and her two daughters safely to
Malaysia. The alleged rapist, Koreemura Ramahatu, 26, is only facing human trafficking charges so far,
confirmed Phang Nga Provincial Police Commander Chalit Kaewyarat to the Phuket Gazette on Thursday.
‘Police may press rape charges against Mr. Koreemura when they have the test result and more information
about the case,’ he said.”); see also Palash Ghosh, Burma: The Tragedy of the Rohingya People, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/burma-tragedy-rohingya-people-213647 (“She [Panchali
Saikia, a research officer at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in India] further stated: ‘AntiRohingya communities in Bangladesh have also pressurized the government to repatriate the Rohingyas.
Due to the denial of protection, assistance, and fear of repatriation, the Rohingyas are now escaping to
Malaysia through the sea route. Malaysia is seen as the best destination because of the religion factor.
Also, the Malaysian government's permit to access the [UN Refugee Agency] has attracted asylum
seekers.’”).
91
See Fleeing Rohingya Women Fall Prey to Traffickers in Thailand, supra note 89; see also
Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20.
92
See, e.g., Fleeing Rohingya Women Fall Prey to Traffickers in Thailand, supra note 89 (“On June
18, Narunisa was released and went to the Khao Lak district police station to press charges. Thomson
Reuters Foundation was present and saw firsthand the problems faced by rape victims seeking justice in
Thailand. The petite woman, dressed in a brown headscarf, a green top and a printed pink sarong,
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death threats and social stigmatization for their ordeal. 93 The myriad
problems surrounding human trafficking in the Burmese context,
specifically, are discussed in the next section.
C.

Human Trafficking of Muslim Women and Girls

Burma’s record on human trafficking has prompted the United States
to place it on a Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years.94 The Watch
List is reserved for countries that fail to comply with minimum standards—
from preventing trafficking to investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of
the crime to protecting victims—as set forth in the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”).95 In fact, both men and women have been subject
to forced labor by Burmese security forces. 96 But women have been
reportedly forced into prostitution and sexual slavery as well.97 Such human
rights violations have penetrated Myanmar’s borders with neighboring
countries, such as Thailand and Bangladesh, which have been forced to
absorb the swelling number of Rohingya refugees.98 Indeed, political and
economic factors in Burma render it a source country for traffickers as tens
of thousands Rohingya flee, including women and children. 99

recounted her experience while waiting patiently to get the attention of the policemen, who for at least 15
minutes argued among themselves whether Khao Lak was the right jurisdiction to investigate the crime.
They then questioned her in detail–a process that required four languages–and were flippant when she was
unable to recall some details. The police continued to voice concerns over jurisdiction problems. At one
point they asked for the exact address of where she was raped, despite repeated explanations that she is
unfamiliar with Thailand. They finally started taking notes, nearly an hour after the victim had stepped
inside the station.”).
93
See, e.g., id. (“A day after filing her complaint, a Thai man reportedly turned up at the shelter and
threatened Narunisa and the shelter director, saying he had killed several Rohingya already and killing
more ‘would be no problem,’ according to Human Rights Watch. The threat was reported to the authorities,
but no police protection has yet been assigned to the shelter at the time of writing. The shelter director has
purchased a gun and set up surveillance cameras. Korlimula and Veerayut, the policemen, have since been
charged but they remain free. Veerayut is believed to be the first Thai official to be charged with trafficking
of Rohingya.”).
94
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2013 COUNTRY NARRATIVES A-C
111-14 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210738.pdf.
95
See id; see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
H.R. 7311, 110th Cong. (2008).
96
See Akins, supra note 43.
97
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 94; see also Akins, supra note 43 (“Many Rohingya have
also been forced to labor on various construction projects as modern-day slaves, including building ‘model
villages’ intended to house the Burmese settlers encouraged to come to the region to displace the Rohingya.
There have been reports of forced prostitution of Rohingya women by the local Burmese security forces.”).
98
See, e.g., Fleeing Rohingya Women Fall Prey to Traffickers in Thailand, supra note 89; Wade,
supra note 79.
99
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2013 COUNTRY NARRATIVES A-C,
supra note 94.
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Unfortunately, Myanmar’s 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law100 does
little to protect this vulnerable population. Accordingly, even those who
successfully escape to neighboring Thailand remain vulnerable to human
trafficking.
1.

Human Trafficking in Burma

Initially, anti-Muslim clashes resulted in thousands of Rohingya men
fleeing Burma in search of work and refuge.101 However, with communal
violence escalating since June 2012, Rohingya women have begun fleeing
the country together with their children.102 The communal violence that
afflicted Arakan State in June 2012, leaving tens of thousands of Rohingya
men, women, and children displaced, illustrates this point.103 According to
Human Rights Watch, as many as 35,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar as a
result.104
In fact, between June 2012 and May 2013, the U.N. Refugee Agency
(“UNHCR”) found that approximately 27,000 people fled Myanmar.105 To
help place these figures in proper perspective, during the same time period
one year earlier in 2011, an estimated 9,000 people are believed to have
fled.106 Moreover, as many as one half of those leaving Rakhine State’s
capital (Sittwe) are women and children who are escaping worsening and
squalid displacement camps. 107 These women and children are highly
vulnerable to forced labor and trafficking because the government does not
recognize them as citizens and refuses to provide them with proper
identification documents or necessary state protection.108
Notably, Burma prohibits human trafficking vis-à-vis the 2005 AntiTrafficking in Persons Law, but its efforts to combat trafficking internally
have been lacking.109 In fact, according to the U.S. Department of State,
100

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, 2005, No. 5/2005 (Myan.), available at http://www.hsph.
harvard.edu/population/trafficking/myanmar.traf.05.pdf.
101
See Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20.
102
See id. (“‘What the flight of women and children signifies is the collapse of hope in the Rohingya
community . . . and the fear that the violence by ethnic Rakhines against the Rohingya could restart easily
on the basis of the slightest perceived provocation,’ said Phil Robertson, deputy director of Asia for Human
Rights Watch.”).
103
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THAILAND: RELEASE AND PROTECT ROHINGYA ‘BOAT PEOPLE’ (2013),
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/20/thailand-release-and-protect-rohingya-boat-people.
104
See id.
105
See Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20.
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 94.
109
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, 2005, No. 5/2005 (Myan.), available at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/trafficking/myanmar.traf.05.pdf.
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Burmese officials reportedly kidnapped Rohingya women from Sittwe and
forced them into sexual slavery on military bases.110
The systematic use of rape and sexual assault as a weapon in conflict
zones contributes to trafficking and sexual exploitation of Rohingya women
and girls. Representative are experiences like that of Sakinah Kahtu, an
eighteen-year-old Rohingya girl forced to leave her village in Rakhine State
due to worsening violence.111 She traveled with human traffickers by sea to
Malaysia together with other fleeing Muslims112 because her parents feared
that if she remained the Burmese security forces might sexually assault her
or subject her to forced labor. 113 In hopes of securing her safety, they paid
traffickers nearly $300 to transport her to Malaysia. 114 Kahtu travelled by
sea for fifteen days in a vessel that carried approximately 500 passengers,
including sixty women and children; they received one meal per day.115
Prior to arriving in Malaysia, however, Kahtu’s traffickers detained her in
Thailand for three days.116 There, a stranger and fellow Rohingya paid
$2,520 to secure her release and complete her journey to Malaysia. In
return, Kahtu’s fellow villagers allowed the young man to wed her.117
2.

Human Trafficking in Thailand

Thailand, which has not signed the 1951 Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees,118 currently hosts the largest number of
refugees from Myanmar. 119 In Thailand, the Rohingya people represent a
stateless population banished from their homes, collectively “caught
between a crocodile and a snake.”120 Unfortunately, Thai officials do not
110

See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2013 COUNTRY NARRATIVES A-C,
supra note 94.
111
Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20 (“Since bloody
sectarian violence last year upended Rakhine’s Rohingya communities–leaving scores dead, thousands of
homes burnt and some 140,000 displaced–their life has become ever more precarious.”).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
available at, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.
119
See Samuel Cheung, Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia:
Implications from the Rohingya Experience, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 50, 57 (2012).
120
Id. at 53; see Zawacki, supra note 30, at 20 (“Unable to avail themselves of the diplomatic or
consular protection of Myanmar, the Rohingyas' stateless status places them in the same position
everywhere, whereby their ‘right to have rights’ is seen by the authorities as lacking. It simply compounds
the precariousness of their situation.”).
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recognize the Rohingya’s right to asylum. 121 Numbering as many as
2,000,000, the Rohingya people live intermingled and without
documentation among a sizable populace of Burmese migrants. 122 If
detected by the authorities, however, they are likely detained or
repatriated.123
In addition, many Rohingya who flee to Malyasia124 do not make it to
their ultimate destination because they are arrested en route and detained by
authorities in Thailand.125 Since January 2013, Thai officials have detained
more than 1,800 Rohingya in immigration centers or government shelters.126
Women and children detained at government-run detention centers remain
vulnerable to both Thai and Rohingya human traffickers who gain access to
the buildings127—places where detainees should theoretically enjoy official
protection.128 After promising detainees reunification with family members,
traffickers smuggle them out of the centers and instead rape the unsuspecting
victim(s). 129 For instance, in June, traffickers who promised to reunite
Narunisa, a 25-year-old Rohingya who was detained in a government
shelter, with her husband in Malaysia for USD 1660, raped her instead.130
Unfortunately, the Thai government has not investigated or prosecuted
trafficking gangs, as they continue to operate with impunity, nor has it
determined how traffickers gain access women and children in detention
centers. 131 In fact, traffickers frequently operate in tandem with corrupt
Thai officials who enable and facilitate such abuse and exploitation.132
121

See Zawacki, supra note 30. (“Known as non-refoulement ,this principle makes irrelevant the fact
that the countries mentioned are not States Parties to the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. The
prohibition against involuntary return of asylum-seekers and refugees is a matter of customary international
law, meaning that it applies regardless of a nation's treaty status.”).
122
See Cheung supra note 119, at 56.
123
See Zawacki, supra note 30.
124
Such as Kahtu, whose journey is described in Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to
Flee Myanmar, supra note 20.
125
See Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20 (“Some 2,000
Rohingya are being held in about two dozen centres in Thailand.”).
126
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103.
127
Id.
128
See Rohingya Women and Children Brave the Seas to Flee Myanmar, supra note 20.
129
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103.
130
Id.
131
See id. (“On May 27, Korlimula helped Narunisa and her two children to escape from the shelter
and took her to meet with other associates. Narunisa and her children were put on a pickup truck driven by
a man, whom she later learned is a police officer at Khao Lak police station in Phang Nga province. The
three of them were taken to six hideouts in the province, and in each case locked up against their will. At
the final hideout on Koh Yipoon Island in Phang Nga province’s Kuraburi district, Korlimula repeatedly
assaulted and raped Narunisa at knifepoint over the course of three days, from June 9 to 11. After that,
Narunisa and her children were dumped on the street in Kuraburi district and the three of them made their
way back to the shelter on June 18. Narunisa reported the rape case at Kuraburi district police station on
June 18, and then filed a formal complaint against Korlimula on June 21. One day after Narunisa filed a
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Hard Labor, Educational Inequality, and the Rohingya Youth

“I wouldn’t have to live this life if I wasn’t a Muslim,”133 reflects a
ten-year-old Rohingya Muslim child forced to perform hard labor—
collecting and carrying rocks for eight hours in hot weather—to earn the
equivalent of one dollar a day to help support his family. 134 His
circumstances are similar to the majority of Rohingya children residing in
Rakhine State, where approximately eighty to ninety percent of Myanmar’s
Rohingya Muslims live. 135 Rohingya children experience poverty in
different ways. The government forces them to perform hard labor, they
face substantial inequality in education, high malnuitrition rates, inadequate
vaccinations, and no access to healthcare.136
Government pickup trucks typically collect the children in the early
morning hours, later depositing them on the riverbeds. 137 The young
children typically work until dusk, scooping up river rocks and carrying
them up a hill.138 Other children assist the government with road repairs for
similar wages.139 The children’s incomes help them and their families eat.140
The region suffers from the country’s highest chronic malnutrition rates,
severely impacting children’s mental and physical development. 141
Additionally, since officials have limited the work of humanitarian agencies
in Rakhine State, children cannot access adequate vaccination coverage,

complaint against the man who raped her and the case threatened to reveal the extent of human trafficking
and smuggling in Phang Nga province, a Thai man showed up at the gate of the Ministry of Social
Development and Human Security’s shelter and made threats on the life of Narunisa and the shelter’s
director. According to the shelter staff, this man said he had killed several Rohingya already. ‘Killing
more women would be no problem,’ he told them. The threat has since been reported to the Ministry of
Social Development and Human Security, as well as the governor and police commissioner of Phang Nga
province. But as of June 27, no police protection has been assigned to the shelter. Also there has been no
action taken against the police officer who was allegedly working with the trafficking gang involved in
Narunisa’s case.”).
132
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING COUNTRY NARRATIVES, BURMA 47 (2013),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210738.pdf; see also CBRO Urges Canadian
Government to Press Burma on Rohingya Ethnic Cleansing, KALADAN PRESS NETWORK (July 29 2013),
http://www.kaladanpress.org/news/332-news-2013/july-2013/4298-cbro-urges-canadian-government-topress-burma-on-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing.
133
McDowell, supra note 2.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. (“They look more like little men than boys: No smiles. Each step sturdy and determined. Not
an ounce of energy wasted.”).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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leaving them exposed to preventable childhood diseases.142 For Rohingya
children in Rakhine, access to healthcare depends upon a family’s financial
ability to bribe security officers at checkpoints to facilitate travel to a
hospital,143 where some physicians may still refuse to treat them.144
Even where severe food insecurity has not forced poverty-stricken
families to put their children to hard labor, Rohingya youth suffer from
formal and substantive educational inequality. Officials prohibit children
from attending Muslim schools, thus leaving government-run schools as the
only option. 145 This prohibition contributes to overcrowding—from
preschool to eighth grade—at institutions where children have no chairs or
desks, and government-appointed Buddhist teachers provide instruction in a
language most students cannot comprehend.146 The teacher-to-student ratio
is estimated to be 1:114, but teachers are frequently absent and fail to secure
substitutes to teach in their place. 147 Such circumstances undermine
effective learning environments, leaving many Muslim villagers with the
belief that Buddhist teachers are not interested in educating Muslim
Rohingya children.148
The poor quality of education has led to an eighty percent illiteracy
rate among the Rohingya. 149 Further, there are very few secondary
schools—approximately twelve high schools for the whole of North Arakan,
with more than 800,000 inhabitants.150 The Rohingya students who wish to
access higher education must confront additional hurdles, including
prohibitions against studying particular substantive areas such as medicine,
dentistry, and engineering. 151 Further, while no formal bar against the
142

Id.
Id. (“With no accurate statistics for northern Rakhine, it's impossible to know how many children
from tiny villages die before they ever make it to a hospital because their families cannot afford bribes
demanded at checkpoints.”).
144
See Muslims Blocked From Rakhine Township Hospitals, Says MSF, RADIO AUSTRALIA (Oct. 22,
2013), http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/asia-pacific/muslims-blocked-fromrakhine-township-hospitals-says-msf/1206856 (“In Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state, minority Muslims
live under apartheid-like conditions, housed in temporary camps and segregated from the majority Buddhist
population. This has led to a health care crisis as Muslims are subject to strict movement restrictions and
local hospitals are known to refuse to treat them.”); see also McDowell, supra note 2 (“‘If I could be
anything, I'd be doctor when I grow up,’ Anwar says. ‘Because whenever someone in my family gets sick
and we go to the hospital, the staff never takes care of us. I feel so bad about that. But I know that will
never happen,’ the third-grader adds. ‘The government wouldn't allow it.’”).
145
See McDowell, supra note 2.
146
See id. (“‘Our teachers write a lot of things on the blackboard, but don't teach us how to read them,’
says 8-year-old Anwar Sjak. ‘It’s very difficult to learn anything in this school.’”).
147
See id.
148
See id.
149
Myanmar: Rohingyas in Malaysia Seek Education, Opportunities, IRIN (June 8, 2011).
150
See id.
151
See McDowell, supra note 2; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BURMA: THE ROHINGYA MUSLIMS 143
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pursuit of university studies exists, there are no universities in northern
Rakhine and, for more than a decade, travel bans have prohibited resident
Rohingya from leaving the area.152
Due to Myanmar’s discriminatory citizenship law, Rohingya children
have been deprived of birth certificates since the mid-1990s, and as depicted
above, are blacklisted if their parents’ marriage is unrecorded in the official
registry or if they are in violation of the two-child limit imposed on their
ethnic group.153 They are often treated in a denigrating and humiliating
manner by non-Muslims; for example, being referred to as “dogs,” or, in the
instance of young girls, having crude sexual insults hurled at them.154 As
communal violence persists, internal displacement places children at greater
risk of family separation as well as physical and emotional damage.155 In
addition, the lack of educational opportunity results in increased
vulnerability to trafficking and exploitative work, as depicted above.156
III.

GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Official policies and normative practices targeting Myanmar’s
minority Muslim population pose a threat not only to Myanmar’s internal
stability but to global and regional security, too. 157 Radical extremists
continue to use maltreatment of co-religionists to manipulate popular
sentiment in order to enhance terrorist recruiting in countries where such
persecution is believed to exist. 158
ENDING A CYCLE OF EXODUS?
(1996),
available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs
/b/burma/burma969.pdf (“In addition, university admission guidelines prevent all but full citizens from
studying medicine, dentistry and engineering at institutes of higher education. Rohingyas who are neither
associate nor naturalized citizens (that is, the majority) but stateless persons or holders of FRCs are also
denied these rights, and in addition they are denied freedom of movement.”).
152
See Khin Maung Lay, supra note 17.
153
See McDowell, supra note 2. Children who are blacklisted cannot access education, receive
official permission to travel, marry or acquire property. They may also be arrested and detained. See also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 44.
154
See id.
155
See Burmese Village Violence Against Children & Families Must Stop, Says UNICEF, WOMEN
NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 2013), http://womennewsnetwork.net/2013/10/09/burmese-violence-unicef/.
156
See Christa Foster Crawford, Cultural, Economic and Legal Factors Underlying Trafficking in
Thailand and Their Impact on Women and Girls from Burma, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 821 (2006).
157
See, e.g., Abdelkader, supra note 12.
158
See Dapice & Nguyen Xuan Thanh, supra note 66; see also JI Protests Against Genocide of
Muslims in Burma, DAILY REGIONAL TIMES OF SINDH (Aug. 4, 2012) (“On the call of the Jamaat-e-Islami,
a protest demonstration was staged on Friday against the genocide of Muslims and dishonoring of Muslim
women in Myanmar (Burma). After Juma prayers, a big protest demonstration was staged by the Jamaat-eIslami Hyderabad Chapter outside the Aurangzeb Mosque. Addressing the participants of the
demonstration, the General Secretary of Jamaat-e-Islami Sindh Rashid Nasim has called upon the members
of the OIC and rulers of the Muslim countries to record a strong protest against the genocide and
dishonouring of the Muslim women. He criticized the role of the activists of the human rights
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Around the world, there is a heightened awareness concerning the
plight of Myanmar’s Rohingya population, including its women and
children, in diaspora and indigenous Muslim communities. At protests
staged in Pakistan by the Islamist organization Jamaat-e-Islami in August
2012, the “dishonoring of thousands of Muslim women” as well as the
murder of Muslim children became rallying cries. 159 While that protest was
reported as peaceful, there have been explicit calls for violence in response
to continued anti-Muslim persecution in Myanmar.160 Indonesian extremists
have called for a “violent jihad” against Burmese Buddhists. 161 In January
2013, a 23-year-old Indonesian man was convicted by local authorities of
plotting an attack against the Burmese Embassy in Jakarta, together with six
others. 162 They allegedly viewed the planned attack as retribution for
official persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Burma.163
Further, attacks have been launched within Myanmar targeting
Buddhist extremist leaders such as the Venerable Wirathu, a leading figure
of the 969 campaign that has been closely associated with anti-Muslim
violence.164 The campaign promotes economic boycotts of Muslim-owned
businesses and opposes intermarriage between Muslims and Buddhists.165
The 969 campaign, named for numbers of religious significance in Buddhist
scripture, has coincided with a surge of violence in which Muslims have
been the principal victims.166 In Rakhine State, 140,000 stateless Rohingya
organizations, who made hue and cry over slashing of a woman but silent over the dishonouring of
thousands of Muslim women, brutal murders of men and children and demolition of mosques in
Myanmar.”).
159
See JI protests against genocide of Muslims in Burma, DAILY REGIONAL TIMES OF SINDH (Aug. 4,
2012).
160
See Michael Bachelard, Bashir Threatens Jihad on Myanmar Buddhists, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (May 4, 2013), http://www.wmh.com.au/world/bashir-threatens-jihad-on-myanmar-buddhists20130503-2iyfw.html (“Islamic terrorists in Indonesia have a new target after militant godfather Abu Bakar
Bashir threatened holy war against Myanmar's Buddhists. Just hours after the threat was reported on
radical site Voice of al-Islam on Thursday, two men were arrested carrying pipe bombs on their way to the
Myanmar embassy in central Jakarta. The report quoted Bashir, who motivated the Bali bombers in 2002,
saying Myanmar was conducting genocide against Rohingya Muslims in the Arakan state in the country's
west, and that jihad was the only solution. Two others were arrested later after anti-terrorism police raided
a property in south Jakarta and seized more explosives. Police spokesman Boy Rafli Amar said those
arrested were seeking revenge for the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.”).
161
See id.
162
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Indonesia Sentences Militant Over Burma Embassy Plot, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/21/indonesia-sentences-militant-burma-embassyplot.
163
See id.
164
See Richard Lloyd Parry, Bomb Attack on 'Burmese Bin Laden' Leaves Five Hurt, THE TIMES
ASIA (July 23, 2013), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article3822758.ece.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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Muslims are living in refugee camps following violent clashes that left more
than 200 people dead. 167
During a representative attack against 969 leaders, Wirathu, who has
been dubbed “the Burmese Osama bin Laden” and “the bald neo-Nazi,” was
targeted with a small handmade bomb placed in a parked car that exploded
as he delivered a speech in July 2013. 168 Authorities have not yet
apprehended the perpetrators of the crime.169 This violence is bound to
escalate and spread to regional and international actors perceived as
supporting Burmese officials responsible for anti-Muslim violence and
persecution.170
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Indeed, peace and security can only become a reality in Myanmar
through just laws. To that end, and in light of the discussion in Parts II and
III, this part proposes a number of legal and policy recommendations,
including A) amending the 1982 Citizenship Act; B) engaging in public
education campaigns to help dispel many of the myths that represent causal
factors in anti-Muslim violence; C) providing resources and support for
victims of gender-based violence; and D) exercising increased vigilance in
identifying, investigating, and prosecuting all those that facilitate human
trafficking.
A.

The Rule of Law: Repeal the 1982 Citizenship Act to Comply with
International Law Obligations and Myanmar’s Constitution

As an initial measure, Myanmar must amend its 1982 Citizenship
Act in order to bring it into compliance with international law. Core
principles of international law recognize citizenship as critical to the
protection of individual rights and impose on states a responsibility to confer
citizenship upon stateless people.172 For instance, the CRC, which Burma
171

167

Id.
Id.
169
Id.
170
For additional discussion, see Abdelkader, supra note 12.
171
See Burma Citizenship Law, 1982 (Myan.), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b4f71b.html.
172
Representative of this principle, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), which Myanmar has not yet signed or ratified, affirmatively recognizes the right of every child
to acquire a nationality. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I14668-English.pdf. In addition, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, to which
Myanmar is not a signatory, requires states to grant persons born within its borders nationality if they
168
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acceded to in 1991,173 provides children the right to acquire nationality.174
The right to a nationality represents a fundamental principle in international
law to which Burma should adhere, particularly in light of its democratic
aspirations. Indeed, Burma should be expected to comply with its
international legal obligations as set forth in the CRC, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), and other
human rights laws, as well as provisions set out in its own constitution.
In its current form, Myanmar’s Citizenship Act denies citizenship to
the majority of an estimated 1,000,000 Muslims within its borders,175 which
has devastating effects for women and children.176 The government must
ensure citizenship rights for Rohingya and other Muslim children who are
otherwise rendered stateless in violation of the UDHR,177 which defines
statelessness as a matter of human rights law.178 Article 15 provides in
relevant part that (1) everyone has the right to a nationality; and (2) no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.179 While the UDHR is not binding, its anti-discrimination
language can be found in five more international instruments, including the
CRC and CEDAW, both of which Burma has ratified and is legally
obligated to respect. 180 Yet, Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Act and its
discriminatory population control regulations clearly violate these
provisions.181
Ratified by the Burmese government on July 22, 1997,182 CEDAW
requires signatory states to bring domestic laws into harmony with its
provisions to ensure both formal and substantive equality for women and
submit periodic national reports detailing compliance. 183 By accepting
would otherwise be rendered stateless. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, Aug. 30, 1961,
989 U.N.T.S. 175, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html.
173
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sep. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.
174
Id.
175
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BURMA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2012) available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204400.pdf.
176
See supra Part II.
177
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
178
Id. at art. 15.
179
Id.
180
See Zawacki, supra note 30, at 19.
181
Burma Citizenship Law, 1982 (Myan.), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.
html. For additional discussion, see Abdelkader, supra note 12.
182
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sep. 3, 1981.
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.
183
Id.
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CEDAW, Burma formally committed to ending gender discrimination, for
instance abolishing the two-child rule that clearly discriminates against
Rohingya women and girls.184 The population control regulations illustrate
how gender inequality has been codified into law and policy, with severe
consequences for affected populations. 185 Indeed, the two-child rule
adversely impacts women’s physical, mental, and emotional health and wellbeing and it leaves blacklisted girls without legal status.186 In addition, the
1982 Citizenship Act renders Rohingya women and girls stateless and more
vulnerable to physical insecurity and gender-based violence.187 Both laws
facilitate systemic gender discrimination in violation of CEDAW.
President Thein Sein should demonstrate national leadership on this
issue with the goal of unifying the nation under a banner of religious
pluralism as well as gender and racial equality. Amending Myanmar’s
citizenship law should be a national priority because so many other
injustices naturally flow from its discriminatory provisions, including the
deprivation of educational and employment opportunities, increased
incidence of human trafficking, and marriage and population control
measures, among others.
For instance, Article 34 of the Burmese Constitution states, “[e]very
citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely
profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health and
to the other provisions of this Constitution.”188 Additionally, Article 354
states that,
Every citizen shall be at liberty . . . if not contrary to the laws,
enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order,
community peace and tranquility or public order and
morality . . . to develop . . . [the] religion they profess and
customs without prejudice to the relations between one national
race and another or among national races and to other faiths.189
Given the current legal status of the Rohingya as a stateless population,
however, Burmese law also denies the group official legal protection of their
religious freedom rights. Indeed, as one observer has noted,
184

See supra Part II.
See id.
186
See id.
187
Burma
Citizenship
Law,
1982
(Myan.),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org
/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html.
188
See id.
189
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, § 34, [2008] translated at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf.
185
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Inside Myanmar, a kind of circularity exists whereby systemic
discrimination renders the Rohingya stateless, while their status
as a stateless population acts as validation for further
discrimination and persecution by the state and its citizens.
Because of this, access to a nationality is commonly known as
‘the right to have rights.’190
In light of the security implications of continued Rohingya
persecution 191 and documented human rights violations 192 the United
Nations General Assembly, together with the United States and Europe,
should press President Thein Sein to grant equal citizenship rights to all
religious and ethnic groups, including the Rohingya and other Muslims.
Myanmar officials should similarly lift all discriminatory regulations
targeting the Rohingya, including restrictions on births, marriage,
educational and employment opportunities, property ownership, and travel,
among others.193
B.

Public Education Campaigns

In addition to amending or revoking discriminatory laws and policies,
Burmese officials must also engage in public education campaigns to help
dispel many of the myths that represent causal factors in anti-Muslim
violence; such an initiative would not only focus upon the general public but
officials and policymakers as well.
Illustrative are misconceptions
concerning rapid population growth among Muslims. 194
Such
misinformation not only informs poor public policy decisions (i.e.,
discriminatory population growth regulations), but also serves to legitimize
violence against a religious minority group seen as attempting to Islamicize
the Buddhist-majority country. 195 Together with popular education
initiatives led by the federal Burmese government, there must be
accountability among those whose rhetoric results in imminent lawless
violence.
Similarly, education and training initiatives are also necessary to
counter gender violence within Myanmar’s security apparatus and society
more generally. Rape and sexual assault in conflict zones must be
190

See Zawacki, supra note 30, at 19.
See supra Part III.
192
See supra Part II.
193
See Abdelkader, supra note 12; see also Zawacki, supra note 30.
194
See supra Part II.
195
See Dapice & Nguyen Xuan Thanh, supra note 66, at 24.
191
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understood as crimes against humanity, as per international law.196 Such
initiatives should represent preventative and rehabilitative measures
prompting a change to the mindset of past or prospective perpetrators. If
democratic governance is to become a reality in Myanmar, military and
security personnel must understand the significance of relating and
respecting members of all communities and of avoiding human rights
violations, including gender-based violence.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that President Thein Sein’s
administration is committed to addressing gender-based violence. In fact, in
September 2013, the Burmese government withheld its support for a United
Nations declaration—signed by 113 member states—to end sexual violence
in conflict zones.197 The UK-led declaration pledges not to permit amnesties
for gender violence in peace agreements and indicates that a new
international protocol will be adopted next year to ensure that evidence
gathered in abuse cases remains admissible in court and extends support to
non-governmental organizations to enhance monitoring and documentation
in gender violence cases.198 Burma’s refusal to sign on to the declaration
comes amid continued reports of sexual assaults against Muslim women by
its security forces.199
196

See, e.g., War Dep’t, Gen. Orders No. 100, § 2, art. 44 (1863), available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B1CE1E21A4237E
E6C12563CD00514C6C; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BAA341028EBFF1
E8C12563CD00519E66; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 14, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=
openDocument&documentId=F0E25F9F56372523C12563CD0051AB8F; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts art. 75(2), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl
/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=086F4BB140C53655C12563CD0051E027;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 4(2), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId
=F9CBD575D47CA6C8C12563CD0051E783; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org
/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=FFCB180D4E99CB26C12563CD0051
BBD9; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 76, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=5FB5CC7AD1C3A
AF7C12563CD0051E08C; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documented=8F7D
6B2DEE119FBAC12563CD0051E0A2.
197
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These crimes bear genocidal elements, and as such, the United
Nations should independently investigate gender violence in Burma’s
conflict zones, including in the Rakhine and Arakan states. In the
international legal context, genocide is defined as acts “committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group.” 200 In the Burmese context, and pursuant to Article II of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,201
such acts encompass the unlawful deprivation of life by imposing
restrictions on births and causing serious bodily or mental harm as detailed
in Part II.202 Interestingly, in 2012, a number of journalists, commentators,
and activists, as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”),
described Burmese officials as engaging in genocide against the
Rohingya. 203 Indeed, the international community should not wait for
human rights violations, such as rape and sexual abuse, to reach the scale of
atrocities in Rwanda or Yugoslavia before undertaking appropriate
responsive action.
C.

Resources and Support for Victims of Gender-Based Violence

While most of this article has focused on Muslim women and children
as victims of pervasive prejudices and hatred, it is important to recognize
their capacity to act as the protagonists of their own story. Indeed, with
proper resources and support from international donors, they can serve as
agents of constructive change within their families, communities, and nation
as survivors of gender-based violence—and eventually thrive, too.
Recently, in September 2013, more than 400 activists and
policymakers attended a Burmese conference focused on ending gender
based violence. 204 Indeed, gender violence is a critical issue that has
impacted members of other ethnic and religious groups in Burma,205 not
200

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cppcg/cppcg_e.pdf. See Zawacki, supra note 30.
201
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202
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merely the Rohingya. While the gathering’s focus was not specific to the
Muslim Burmese experience, it is imperative that such gender-based
campaigns remain inclusive of women and girls from all religious and ethnic
minority groups, including those who continue to be raped and tortured even
at the time of this writing.
New programmatic initiatives emphasizing progress and development
for women in Burma should be inclusive of Rohingya and other Muslim
women. Often, the key areas of programmatic focus, such as health
awareness, prevention and treatment, education and training, and expanded
economic opportunities for women, 206 speak to the needs of many Rohingya
women and girls. Given the physical and psychological state of many
survivors of gender-based violence resulting from their religious and/or
ethnic identities, more culturally sensitive victim services may be needed—
and other female survivors may be best situated to help facilitate provision
of such services to members of their respective religious and ethnic
communities.
Such programs should encompass restorative justice
mechanisms—restoring the victims’ emotional and material losses—to help
rehabilitate victims of human rights abuses and reintegrate them back into
their communities.207
During the September 2013 women’s conference, there was also
discussion of a new domestic law prohibiting acts of gender violence in the
private and public spheres as well as related constitutional amendments
towards gender equitable reform. 208 Female members of religious and
ethnic minority groups, such as the Rohingya, who have been deprived of
documented 173 of cases of rape and other sexual violence at the hands of government soldiers in Shan
State between 1996 and 2001. Since 2002, the network has received more than 300 complaints of rape
committed by soldiers, and less than a year after the government signed a ceasefire with Shan rebels in
January 2012, the group said it had received more than 10 reports of rape, adding that many more cases
likely went unreported. In Kachin State, where a ceasefire broke down in 2011, sexual violence has also
been reported amid continuing clashes between government troops and the Kachin Independence Army
(‘KIA’). In a shocking case last year in May, a grandmother with 12 children was reportedly beaten and
gang-raped by 10 soldiers in a church.”)
206
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for Women and Girls to Empower Women in Burma, INVESTMENT WEEKLY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2012),
http://www.verticalnews.com/article.php?articleID=7313474.
207
See Mark Umbreit, What is Restorative Justice, CNTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE &
PEACEMAKING, U. OF MINN. (1999), available at http://www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/rjp/resources/rj_dialogue
_resources/RJ_Principles/What_is_RJ.pdf (“Research has found restorative justice programs to have high
levels of victim and offender satisfaction with the process and outcome, greater likelihood of successful
restitution completion by the offender, reduced fear among victims, and reduced frequency and severity of
further criminal behavior.”).
208
See Michaels, supra note 78 (“He declined to comment on Burma’s decision not to sign the
declaration this week. ‘I cannot say now [about the declaration], but the first step now is that we are trying
to develop an anti-violence against women law,’ he said. ‘This would include domestic violence and
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equal citizenship rights, must be able to avail themselves of protection under
the new provisions. Further, it is important for officials to advance the rights
of all women—irrespective of their racial, ethnic, or religious identities—in
legal structures and normative practice to ensure formal and substantive
equality in employment and educational opportunities. Officials should
promote access to justice and health care services to help address lingering
effects of past abuses, such as the two-child rule and gender-based violence.
D.

The Rule of Law: Identify, Investigate, and Prosecute All Those that
Facilitate Human Trafficking.

Addressing the above issues indirectly addresses the issue of human
trafficking vis-à-vis Myanmar’s status as an origin country supplying
prospective victims fleeing persecution, communal violence, and abject
poverty. Further, destination countries such as Thailand should exercise
much more vigilance in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting all people
who facilitate trafficking.
Presently, Thai and Burmese efforts to combat trafficking have been
less than vigilant.209 For example, the Thai government has not investigated
or prosecuted trafficking gangs, and it allows them to continue to operate
with impunity.210 Nor have Thai officials determined why traffickers can
access women and children in the detention centers described above.211
Thailand should exercise much more vigilance in identifying, investigating,
and prosecuting all those that facilitate trafficking. In the instance of
organized criminal elements, officials should trace, freeze, and confiscate
related proceeds and provide unconditional assistance to victims regardless
of their citizenship status or religious or ethnic identities. Thai officials
should also address the demand-side factors contributing to the exploitation
of women and children within their borders. 212
As to Myanmar, although it prohibits human trafficking vis-à-vis its
2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, its efforts to combat trafficking
internally have been lacking, as evidenced by the egregious conduct of its
own security forces discussed in Section II. Moreover, Myanmar will
remain a source country supplying prospective trafficking victims (fleeing
religious and ethnic persecution) until it effectively addresses the underlying
209

See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
210
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211
See id.
212
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causes of persistent communal violence and abject poverty confronting its
minority Muslim population. Simply put, the plight of women and children
seeking a better life should not result in trafficking, exploitation and gender
violence.
V.

CONCLUSION

The international community has praised Myanmar for political and
economic reforms since the end of military rule in 2011. Still, severe human
rights problems persist, evidencing the country’s struggle with democracy as
oppressed members of ethnic and religious minority groups’ fight for
survival. Burmese officials would do well to recognize that such conditions
will depress foreign investment, political development, and wider diplomatic
acceptance. 213 The status quo—abject poverty, gender-based and antiMuslim violence, discriminatory laws and policies—will continue to
undermine progress for Myanmar and the region. 214 Indeed, Burmese
success as a burgeoning democracy in the Southeast Asian region is
intimately linked to the status and experiences of its ethnic and minority
groups. Without dramatically modified laws and policies—ones that respect
the rights of all irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion or gender—it remains
unclear whether Myanmar will succeed on the path to becoming the
democracy to which it aspires.
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